WITHOUT EGYPT, ISRAEL WILL BE LEFT WITH NO FRIENDS IN MIDEAST
Without Egypt's Mubarak and with relations with Turkey in shambles, Israel will be forced to court new potential allies.
By Aluf Benn
29.01.11
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/without-egypt-israel-will-be-left-with-no-friends-in-mideast-1.339926
The fading power of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's government leaves Israel in a state of strategic distress.
Without Mubarak, Israel is left with almost no friends in the Middle East;
last year, Israel saw its alliance with Turkey collapse.
From now on, it will be hard for Israel to trust an Egyptian government torn apart by internal strife.
Israel's increasing isolation in the region, coupled with a weakening United States, will force the government to court new potential allies.
Israel's foreign policy has depended on regional alliances which have provided the country with strategic depth since the 1950s.
The country's first partner was France, which at the time ruled over northern Africa and provided Israel with advanced weaponry and nuclear capabilities.
After Israel's war against Egypt in 1956, David Ben-Gurion attempted to establish alliances with non-Arab countries in the region, including Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia.
The Shah of Iran became a significant ally of Israel, supplying the country with oil and money from weapons purchases.
The countries' militaries and intelligence agencies worked on joint operations against Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule, which was seen as the main threat against Israel and pro-Western Arab governments.
Israel's next alliances were forged with Jordan's King Hussein and Morocco's King Hassan.
These ties were operated in secret, as well as ties with leaders in Lebanon's Christian community.
The late 1970s saw the fall of the Shah of Iran, with an anti-Israel Islamic republic created in his stead.
Around the same time, Egypt and Israel broke their cycle of conflict by signing a peace agreement.
Egypt positioned itself on the side of Saudi Arabia, as head of the pro-American camp.
Mubarak inherited the peace agreement after President Anwar Sadat's assassination.
Mubarak was cold in his public relations with Israel, refusing to visit the country except for Yitzhak Rabin's funeral, which decelerated normalization between the countries.
Relations between the Israel Defense Forces and the Egyptian army were conducted on a low level, with no joint exercises.
Egyptian public opinion was openly hostile towards Israel and anti-Semitic terminology was common.
Civil relations between the countries were carried out by a handful of government workers and businessmen.
Despite all of this, the "cold peace" with Egypt was the most important strategic alliance Israel had in the Middle East.
The security provided by the alliance gave Israel the chance to concentrate its forces on the northern front and around the settlements. [Gaza aussi.] [Et le Liban. 2 fois!]
Starting in 1985, peace with Egypt allowed for Israel to cut its defense budget, which greatly benefited the economy.
Mubarak became president while Israel was governed by Menachim Begin, and has worked with eight different Israeli leaders since then.
He had close relations with Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin Netanyahu.
In the last two years, despite a stagnation [?] in peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and worsening relations between Netanyahu and the Arab world, Mubarak has hosted the prime minister both in Cairo and in Sharm el-Sheikh.
The friendship between Mubarak and Netanyahu is based on a mutual fear over Iran's strengthening and the rising power of Islamists,
as well as over the weakening and distancing of the U.S. government with Barack Obama at its head.
Now, with Mubarak struggling over the survival of his government, Israel is left with two strategic allies in the region: Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. [!]
These two allies promise to strengthen Israel's Eastern battlefront and are also working to stop terror attacks and slow down Hamas.
But Israel's relationship with these two allies is complicated.
Joint security exercises are modest and the relationship between the leaders is poor.
Jordan's King Abdullah refuses to meet Netanyahu, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is waging a diplomatic struggle against Israel's right-wing government.
It's hard to tell how Jordan and the PA could fill the role that Egypt has played for Israel.
[Parce qu'ils ne le peuvent pas!]
In this situation, Israel will be forced to seek out new allies.
The natural candidates include Syria, which is striving to exploit Egypt's weakness to claim a place among the key nations in the region.
The images from Cairo and Tunisia surely send chills down the backs of Syrian President Bashar Assad and his cronies, despite the achievement they achieved with the new Hezbollah-backed Lebanon government.
As long as the Arab world is flooded with waves of angry anti-government protests, Assad and Netanyahu will be left to safeguard the old order of the Middle East.
Without Egypt's Mubarak and with relations with Turkey in shambles, Israel will be forced to court new potential allies.
By Aluf Benn
29.01.11
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/without-egypt-israel-will-be-left-with-no-friends-in-mideast-1.339926
The fading power of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's government leaves Israel in a state of strategic distress.
Without Mubarak, Israel is left with almost no friends in the Middle East;
last year, Israel saw its alliance with Turkey collapse.
From now on, it will be hard for Israel to trust an Egyptian government torn apart by internal strife.
Israel's increasing isolation in the region, coupled with a weakening United States, will force the government to court new potential allies.
Israel's foreign policy has depended on regional alliances which have provided the country with strategic depth since the 1950s.
The country's first partner was France, which at the time ruled over northern Africa and provided Israel with advanced weaponry and nuclear capabilities.
After Israel's war against Egypt in 1956, David Ben-Gurion attempted to establish alliances with non-Arab countries in the region, including Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia.
The Shah of Iran became a significant ally of Israel, supplying the country with oil and money from weapons purchases.
The countries' militaries and intelligence agencies worked on joint operations against Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule, which was seen as the main threat against Israel and pro-Western Arab governments.
Israel's next alliances were forged with Jordan's King Hussein and Morocco's King Hassan.
These ties were operated in secret, as well as ties with leaders in Lebanon's Christian community.
The late 1970s saw the fall of the Shah of Iran, with an anti-Israel Islamic republic created in his stead.
Around the same time, Egypt and Israel broke their cycle of conflict by signing a peace agreement.
Egypt positioned itself on the side of Saudi Arabia, as head of the pro-American camp.
Mubarak inherited the peace agreement after President Anwar Sadat's assassination.
Mubarak was cold in his public relations with Israel, refusing to visit the country except for Yitzhak Rabin's funeral, which decelerated normalization between the countries.
Relations between the Israel Defense Forces and the Egyptian army were conducted on a low level, with no joint exercises.
Egyptian public opinion was openly hostile towards Israel and anti-Semitic terminology was common.
Civil relations between the countries were carried out by a handful of government workers and businessmen.
Despite all of this, the "cold peace" with Egypt was the most important strategic alliance Israel had in the Middle East.
The security provided by the alliance gave Israel the chance to concentrate its forces on the northern front and around the settlements. [Gaza aussi.] [Et le Liban. 2 fois!]
Starting in 1985, peace with Egypt allowed for Israel to cut its defense budget, which greatly benefited the economy.
Mubarak became president while Israel was governed by Menachim Begin, and has worked with eight different Israeli leaders since then.
He had close relations with Yitzhak Rabin and Benjamin Netanyahu.
In the last two years, despite a stagnation [?] in peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians and worsening relations between Netanyahu and the Arab world, Mubarak has hosted the prime minister both in Cairo and in Sharm el-Sheikh.
The friendship between Mubarak and Netanyahu is based on a mutual fear over Iran's strengthening and the rising power of Islamists,
as well as over the weakening and distancing of the U.S. government with Barack Obama at its head.
Now, with Mubarak struggling over the survival of his government, Israel is left with two strategic allies in the region: Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. [!]
These two allies promise to strengthen Israel's Eastern battlefront and are also working to stop terror attacks and slow down Hamas.
But Israel's relationship with these two allies is complicated.
Joint security exercises are modest and the relationship between the leaders is poor.
Jordan's King Abdullah refuses to meet Netanyahu, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is waging a diplomatic struggle against Israel's right-wing government.
It's hard to tell how Jordan and the PA could fill the role that Egypt has played for Israel.
[Parce qu'ils ne le peuvent pas!]
In this situation, Israel will be forced to seek out new allies.
The natural candidates include Syria, which is striving to exploit Egypt's weakness to claim a place among the key nations in the region.
The images from Cairo and Tunisia surely send chills down the backs of Syrian President Bashar Assad and his cronies, despite the achievement they achieved with the new Hezbollah-backed Lebanon government.
As long as the Arab world is flooded with waves of angry anti-government protests, Assad and Netanyahu will be left to safeguard the old order of the Middle East.
*
Photo. Emilio Morenatti. AP
http://imgs.sfgate.com/n/p/2011/02/08/faa52d68-3aed-4e0a-aa69-ef9b2039dd04.jpg
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/02/08/financial/f072108S19.DTL&
